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THE KYLLO CONUNDRUM: A NEW STANDARD TO ADDRESS
TECHNOLOGY THAT REPRESENTS A STEP BACKWARD FOR
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
An oft-quoted maxim of judicial wisdom is Oliver Wendell
Holmes's observation that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience."' Applied to the field of thermal imaging surveillance
technology, this maxim demonstrates the complicated and often conflict-
ing standards by which application of technology has been judicially
evaluated. The most recent development in this area of technological
jurisprudence has been the Supreme Court's opinion in Kyllo v. United
2States, where a sharply divided court concluded that use of a thermal
imaging device constituted a search that invoked the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.3 The Court also concluded that a new "bright line"
needed to be drawn so that courts could apply Fourth Amendment doc-
trines to new and evolving technologies.4
Part I of this comment reviews the skeleton of Fourth Amendment
analysis, from its basis in trespass and property to the advent of the Katz
two-prong test, and the application of Fourth Amendment analysis to
other modem and new technologies. Part II discusses thermal imaging
basics and prior decisions addressing the application of the Fourth
Amendment to this type of scan. Part HI analyzes the Court's decision in
Kyllo v. United States. Part IV concludes that the Court actually returned
to an intransigent view of Fourth Amendment application; one that is
dangerously ill-equipped to handle future evolution of surveillance tech-
nology.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WITH RESPECT TO
EVOLVING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
A. Early Origins and History
The early American colonial experience with unconstrained writs of
assistance produced a fundamental distrust of unfettered investigatory
powers.5 British common law had established the primacy of a man's
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881), reprinted in PRAGMATISM: A
READER, at 137 (Louis Menand ed.,Vintage Books 1997).
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
4. Id. at 36, 40.
5. See, e.g., Navigation Act, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. H, c. 11, § 5 (Eng.) (This investigatory
power is reflected in the British Navigation Acts, which authorized officials to "go into any house,
463
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
domicile, but the colonists found little comfort in this concept when this
protection was tested against the magistrates' authorities. 6 In order to
enforce colonial revenue laws, British authorities used writs of assistance
to authorize the bearer to enter into any house or other place to conduct a
search for taxable commodities. In response to the predictable abuses
that occurred, the drafters of the Bill of Rights adopted the Fourth
Amendment, guaranteeing that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." 8 As interpreted by the courts over the
years, this has come to stand for the need to ensure dispassionate judicial
review of evidence prior to issuing a warrant to law enforcement person-
nel.9
As the body of law supporting the Fourth Amendment has grown,
three essential doctrines have developed that are specifically applicable
to the integration of new technology into the police investigatory arsenal.
The first doctrine concerns the need and ability of law enforcement per-
sonnel to secure a warrant prior to surveillance activities. The second of
these doctrines involves the shifting recognition of property rights as
invoking a fundamentally different level of Constitutional protection.
The final doctrine considers the relationship between Fourth Amendment
protections and various private and administrative searches.
B. The Shift Away from Warrants to Reasonableness
One of the central debates that has influenced the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is whether warrantless searches can
pass constitutional muster.' 0 This has clear application today as courts
struggle to define the scope of police investigatory power in light of an
shop, cellar, warehouse or room... and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and
other package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any kind of goods or merchandize
whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed.").
6. See Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194 (K.B. 1604) (citing the famous proposition
that "every man's house is his castle").
7. O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause Of the American Revolution, in THE ERA
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40,40-41, 43-44 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Mark Young, What Big Eyes You
Have!: A New Regime for Covert Government Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1047-48
(2001).
10. Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (expressing the "cardinal
rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants
wherever reasonably practicable"), and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) ("The
[Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches
that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence. In the
scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause,' plays a crucial part."), with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)
(stating that the relevant test is "not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable").
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ever-evolving technological landscape that makes searches less intrusive,
quicker, and easier to conduct. 1 The starting point for the debate in-
volves revisions to the draft of the Fourth Amendment submitted by
James Madison. Madison's introduced version provided: "The rights of
the people to be secured.., from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause ....
At some point before final ratification, the House defeated a motion to
substitute the phrase "and no warrant shall issue" for the phrase "by war-
rants issuing."'13 However, the text of the final amendment includes this
supposedly defeated provision, invoking decades of debate about
whether the two clauses-"the right of the people to be secure .. .
against unreasonable searches" and "and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause"-are to be read together (with searches presump-
tively unreasonable if they lack a warrant), or if they each stand alone
(allowing for the recognition of a "reasonable" warrantless search).
14
Early Supreme Court decisions seemed to support the former inter-
pretation, indicating strong preference for police investigatory activities
supported by warrants. 15 However, the Court gradually began to support
the latter interpretation. Starting in the arena of "searches incident to
arrest," courts began eroding the warrant requirement as they recognized
a "well established right of law enforcement officers to arrest without a
warrant for a felony committed in their presence."'
' 6
This exception to the need to obtain a warrant blossomed into pro-
tection for all "reasonable searches," as recognized in the seminal case of
United States v. Rabinowitz.'7 Since that decision, the Court has vacil-
lated between these two competing doctrinal approaches, 18 looking most
recently to enhance the power of law enforcement by recognizing that
searches themselves must only comport with a general "reasonableness"
11. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 36.
12. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-41, 450, 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
13. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrTUTION 101-03 (1937).
14. See Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1988).
15. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627, 630 (1886) (approving of Lord Camden's
argument that "it is now incumbent upon the defendants to show the law by which this seizure is
warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass").
16. Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 704 (overruled on other grounds); see also Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (observing that, in American jurisprudence, the legality of a search incident
to a lawful arrest is not in doubt); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (recognizing
the legality of a search of an individual following a lawful arrest); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914) (noting the uniform acceptance of the government's right to search the person of the
accused upon a legal arrest of that person); Sundby, supra note 14, at 387-90.
17. 339 U.S 56, 65-66 (1950).
18. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 ("In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the
requirement that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,' plays a crucial part.").
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criteria.19 This shift away from a hard and fast warrant requirement has
been a precursor to the rise of balancing tests, designed to measure "rea-
sonableness" by weighing governmental regulatory interest against the
individual's privacy interest. ° Clear application of this phenomenon can
be seen in the next area of Fourth Amendment evolution, the transition
from property-based claims to a personal sense of privacy.
C. Property or Portable Reasonableness?
1. Actual Physical Invasions
As the courts strayed from the presumptive unconstitutionality of a
warrantless search or seizure, it became necessary to determine when the
Fourth Amendment applied. In order for Fourth Amendment protections
to apply, there must be a "search" under the color of official action, with
a subsequent attempt to use what is seized.21 The early jurisprudential
basis for privacy rights was derived from English common law, reflect-
ing Lord Camden's idea that "the great end for which men entered soci-
ety was to secure property ... [and] every invasion of private property,
be it ever so minute, is a trespass. 22 The Supreme Court echoed this
property-based rationale in an early case involving the application of
developing technology, Olmstead v. United States.23 In this case, the
Supreme Court concluded that wiretapping was not a constitutionally
recognizable search, relying principally upon the lack of physical inva-
sion of the defendant's property.24 Specifically, a 5-4 majority concluded
that the wiretapping was permissible because (1) the agents gained ac-
cess to the telephone wires without any "entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants," and (2) the agents obtained the content of the conversa-
tions that passed over the wires but did not acquire physical objects.25 In
a somewhat ominous note foreshadowing later developments in this area
of law, Justice Brandeis in his dissent noted that the "progress of science
in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to
19. See Matthew Pring, Survey, The Death of A Doctrine: The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
and Random Suspicionless Urine Drug Testing Eroding the "Special Needs Doctrine," 79 DENV. U.
L. REv. 457, 458 (2002); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-86 (1990); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 340-43 (1985).
20. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
21. See Fredrick Alexander & John Amsden, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 75 GEO. L.J.
713, 714 (1987); see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). But see State v. Helfrich,
600 P.2d 816, 818-19 (Mont. 1979) (holding that under the Montana Constitution, the right to
privacy is protected from actions by both state and private actors, extending protection to all invasive
actions).
22. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (K.B. 1765).
23. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
24. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
25. Id. at 464-65.
[Vol. 80:2
THE KYLLO CONUNDRUM
stop with wire tapping. 26 The persistence of this "actual physical inva-
sion" test is seen in the fact that that this property-based view of the
Fourth Amendment persevered even after wiretapping was made unlaw-
ful by statute. 7
2. The Introduction of "Reasonableness"
New technology and an evolving recognition of the limits of prop-
erty law to address privacy interests eventually produced a fundamental
shift in the basis for Fourth Amendment protection. In the case of Katz v.
United States28, the Supreme Court rejected Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of property, ruling instead that the Amendment "protects people, not
places. 29 In Katz, FBI agents overheard the defendant's end of a tele-
phone conversation by attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the exterior of the public telephone booth from which he was
calling.30 The Court refused to decide the issue on the basis of whether a
person has a personal right of privacy in a phone booth based on property
rights.31 Instead, the Court found the use of this "detectaphone" consti-
tuted a search invoking Fourth Amendment protections, since what a
person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected., 32 In doing so, the Court
shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the individual
and away from her property.33 As the Court noted in reaching its final
holding, "One who.., shuts the door behind him.., is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world.,
34
The two-part test proposed by Justice Harlan in his concurring opin-
ion in Katz eventually came to be recognized as the new measuring stick
for the legitimacy of government searches. 35 The first prong of the test
involves evaluating whether the individual in question "exhibited an ac-
26. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. See Frank Eichenlaub, Carnivore: Taking a Bite Out of the Fourth Amendment?, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 315, 334 (2001); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-12 (1961) (ruling
evidence gathered by law enforcement officers inadmissible because the evidence was gathered
through means of a listening device that had intruded unlawfully upon the premises occupied by the
defendants); Goldman v United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-35 (1942) (holding that officers' use of a
"detectaphone" to hear defendants' conversations emanating from next room did not constitute
trespass or violation of Fourth Amendment).
28. *389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 350.
32. Id. at351.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 352.
35. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Jonathan Todd Laba, If You Can't Stand the Heat,
Get Out of the Drug Business: Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth
Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (1996).
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tual (subjective) expectation of privacy.' ' 36 Many judicial commentators
have criticized this first prong as being circular in nature.37 Even the
creator of the test, Justice Harlan, came to recognize its limitations, ex-
plaining in United States v. White,38 "Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the
customs and values of the past and present."39 This eventually led Justice
Harlan to reject this prong of the test in its entirety, stating that the Court
"must ...transcend the search for subjective expectations."4° Corre-
spondingly, as technology allows new levels of intrusiveness into the
private domain, and citizens become aware of these new surveillance
techniques, their subjective expectations of privacy must necessarily be
lowered.
4 1
The second prong of the Katz test involves assessing whether one
has a legitimate expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.' ' 42 As the Supreme Court has noted, there are some
expectations that society is simply not prepared to accept.43 In practice,
this standard has come to reflect a balancing test between the needs of
law enforcement and the importance of the individual interest threatened;
if societal standards dictate that there is a lesser expectation of privacy in
a particular area, then the scope of the invasiveness may increase.44 Criti-
cism has been directed at this prong of the test because it fails to include
36. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. See Laba, supra note 35, at 1445.
38. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
39. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 n.5 (1979) (noting that, in certain circumstances, the two-prong Katz test would be an
inadequate measure of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, the government could not
destroy all grounds of subjective expectation by simply announcing that henceforth all homes would
be subject to warrantless entry, and thus destroy the legitimate expectation of privacy.).
40. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. See Melvin Gutterman, A Formation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 677
(1988).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See Gutterman, supra note 41, at 665-66; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-41 (1988) (holding that no expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable
existed in garbage left outside a home); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (recognizing
that no expectation of privacy remained in an area outside of a home that could be observed by all
commercial air travel); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983) (holding that there could be no
reasonable expectation of privacy for material placed in a shipping container subsequently opened
and inspected by customs agents); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (rejecting petitioner's claim of a
reasonable expectation of privacy for numbers dialed on a telephone after police had monitored and
gathered such numbers through use of a pen register); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437,
440-43, 445 (1976) (identifying no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records).
44. See Pring, supra note 19, at 458. Compare United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 811
(1982) (noting that expectations of privacy in personal luggage and other closed containers must be
substantially greater than in the area of an enclosed automobile), with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979) (noting if the personal luggage is found in a car, the expectation of privacy must
correspondingly be less).
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some appraisal of underlying conduct.45 For instance, if two kidnappers
take their victim to a secluded location, they would expect privacy in this
location. However, given the criminal nature of their activities, a court
would probably not recognize their expectations as reasonable, irrespec-
tive of this second "objective" expectation of privacy test.
The Katz test has been applied to a number of "new" technologies in
an effort to define the proper balance between investigative necessity and
individual rights.46 Regarding binoculars and telescopes, courts have held
that use of these devices does not constitute a search. 47 The Supreme
Court has twice addressed the use of beeper tracers in the cases of United
States v. Knotts48 and United States v. Karo,49 developing a somewhat
contradictory line of precedence for use of this technology. The Knotts
agents used a beeper tracer to monitor a chloroform container while in-
side a cabin.50 The Court found that the beeper tracer had initially been
used on public streets, and applied the second prong of the Katz test to
conclude that since there could be no legitimate expectation of privacy
on these public streets, there was no search. 5' However, in the Karo case,
the Court concluded that a beeper being monitored by agents while in-
side a house revealed "a critical fact about the interior of the premises
that [they] . . . could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.,
52
As the Court expounded, "Private residences are places in which the in-
dividual normally expects privacy free of government intrusion ... and
that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable. ' 3
45. See John M. Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink,
15 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 515, 527-29 (1984) (stating the subjective component of Katz distorts the
protections of the Fourth Amendment); see also White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("This question must.., be answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely
extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as
a technique of law enforcement.").
46. See Gutterman, supra note 41, at 717 (arguing against questions of search and seizure
depending on technology).
47. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (holding that the use of a searchlight is
the same as the use of field glasses, therefore not a search); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38
(4th Cir. 1973) (holding that use of binoculars is not a search); People v. Hicks, 364 N.E.2d 440, 444
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that use of night vision binoculars is not a search).
48. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
49. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
50. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-79.
51. Id. at 281-82, 285.
52. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
53. Id. at 714.
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3. Statutory and Judicial Interplay Involving Surveillance Technol-
ogy
Title IfI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,54 passed the year after the Katz decision, specifically addressed the
subject of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. 55 Under this legisla-
tion, government officials were given the authority to apply to a federal
judge for an order permitting interception of wire or oral communica-
tions, when such activity may provide evidence of certain enumerated
crimes. 56 A judge may then grant the order ex parte, upon belief of prob-
able cause that the named individual is committing the alleged enumer-
ated offense, but for no longer than "is necessary to achieve the objective
of the authorization," or in any account, not longer than 30 days.57 One
other important factor associated with this provision is that when one of
several named officials finds that "an emergency situation exists that
involves (i) immediate danger of death .... (ii) conspiratorial activities
threatening the national security interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities
characteristic of organized crime," an interception without prior judicial
authorization is permitted.58
Dalia v. United States59 reflects how the Supreme Court has viewed
the broad authorizations statutorily established by Congress. In Dalia,
F.B.I. agents entered an office to install a listening device and then reen-
tered to remove it, all pursuant to a court order obtained under the Title
HI authorizations.60 Rejecting arguments about the trespassory nature of
the agents' activities, the Court concluded that:
one simply cannot assume that Congress, aware that most bugging
requires covert entry, nonetheless wished to except surveillance re-
quiring such entries from the broad authorization of Title III ....
Those considering the surveillance legislation understood that, by au-
thorizing electronic interception of oral communications in addition
to wire communications, they were necessarily authorizing surrepti-
tious entries.
6 1
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000).
55. See id.
56. Id. § 2516(1).
57. Id. § 2518.
58. Id.; see also Geoffrey North, Carnivore in Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic
Communications Act's Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
155 (2002) (discussing the Act and digital surveillance).
59. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
60. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 241, 245.
61. Id. at 252.
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The Dalia decision became controversial for its additional holding that a
court did not need to specifically authorize the covert entry of agents.62
The relevance of this point to other forms of electronic surveillance can
be found in Justice Brennan's dissent from the case, in which he noted
that the "practice entails an invasion of privacy of constitutional signifi-
,,63cance distinct from that which attends nontrespassory surveillance.
Inherent in the dissent's position is a property-based distinction that sub-
scribes to the idea that the Fourth Amendment offers different levels of
protections depending upon the degree of actual physical intrusion asso-
ciated with the process.
D. The Interplay Between Private and Public Actors
1. Third Party Actor Involvement
In the Katz decision, the Supreme Court concluded, "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 64 This language is the starting
point for judicial review of the actions of third parties as proof of the
scope of personal privacy expectations. Primarily, the Fourth Amend-
ment protects individuals from government action, and as such, it applies
only when a government actor is involved.6' However, third parties can
act as agents of the government, thereby invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.66
Another rationale for not applying Fourth Amendment protections
to private searches and seizures is that as a person exposes something to
a private actor, both his subjective expectation of privacy and the objec-
tive status society is willing to accord that expectation decrease.67 As one
example of this, when a person conveys information to a third party,
even during an apparently private conversation, that person cannot rea-
sonably expect the information will remain protected within the context
of the Fourth Amendment.68 This doctrine has been extended to cover the
actions of third party institutions, such as a bank69 or telephone com-
62. Id. at 257 ("Nothing in the language of the Constitution . . . suggests that . . . search
warrants also must include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be executed.").
63. Id. at 259-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
65. See Alexander & Amsden, supra note 21.
66. See id. at 715 & n.13 (discussing various court tests to determine if an actor is a
government agent).
.67. See Brian Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627 (1989).
68. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (ruling on a government
informant who reported the conversation to government agents).
69. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
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pany,7° when these actors subsequently convey the information to law
enforcement personnel.
2. Open Fields Surveillance
The most significant application of this doctrine to the field of
Kyllo-type surveillance comes from the so-called "open fields" doctrine.
Under this principle, espoused initially in the case of Oliver v. United
States,7' the Court started by recognizing "the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic. 72 The Court then concluded "open fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. 73 Con-
sequently, in areas outside the immediate surroundings of a home, indi-
viduals have a reduced expectation of privacy and society is prepared to
recognize only minimal protections as reasonable.74 If government actors
can view areas the general public can also view, the search is constitu-
tionally permissible, because the area is akin to an "open field., 75 For
example, in Florida v. Riley76 the Court concluded that observation of a
greenhouse by a police helicopter was a constitutionally permissible
search because the test was "whether [the helicopter] was in the public
airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with suffi-
cient regularity that respondent's expectation was not one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 77 Here again, the fact that a pri-
vate citizen could observe what law enforcement officials ultimately saw
was used as proof by the Court that no legitimate expectation of privacy
existed, even in an area closely associated with "the overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home."
3. Private Naked Eyes
The final relevant application of private actor searches depends on
the general public's availability and current use of the surveillance tech-
nology employed by government actors. The Court has concluded that
when devices employed by law enforcement personnel merely enhance
the surveillance capability that ordinary citizens could use to observe a
70. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742, 745-46.
71. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
72. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
73. Id. at 179.
74. See Susan Moore, Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions,
Remote Sensing, and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 819 (1994).
75. See Young, supra note 9, at 1054.
76. 448 U.S. 445 (1989).
77. Riley, 448 U.S. at 446.
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defendant's activities, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.78 How-
ever, with increasingly sophisticated technology, the likelihood that the
general public would use these technologies decreases. When this occurs,
courts have been more willing to circumscribe police activities by invok-
ing Fourth Amendment protections. 79 The natural progression of tech-
nology has required judicial officers to consider the use of items as com-
monplace as binoculars and as complex as thermal imaging devices.
II. USE OF THERMAL IMAGING TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. What is Thermal Imaging Technology?
A basic understanding of thermal imaging technology can help de-
fine precisely what sorts of intrusions occur when these devices are em-
ployed by law enforcement personnel. Any object with a temperature
above absolute zero emits radiation in the infrared spectrum.80 A thermal
imaging device detects this infrared radiation and then converts the heat
reading into a two-dimensional picture.81 The picture depicts various
shades of gray according to the levels of heat radiated by objects; hotter
objects appear lighter in color due to the fact that they radiate more infra-
red energy.82 The thermal imager neither alters nor enhances the radia-
tion, but solely detects differences in heat between the target and the
ambient background.83 Most importantly, there are no beams penetrating
a structure when the device is employed; thermal imagers merely pas-
sively scan the surrounding environment to measure respective heat sig-
natures.
84
Thermal imaging technology has been widely adopted by law en-
forcement personnel in the search for illegal drug cultivation.85 Indoor
78. See Moore, supra note 74, at 851; see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 239 (1986) (holding use of an aerial camera did not invoke Fourth Amendment protections
given); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding that an electronic tracking device attached to a car did not
constitute a search because the movements of the car could be observed by the naked eye).
79. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 720-21 (holding that a beeper tracer that reveals information not
available without unaided surveillance does invoke Fourth Amendment protections).
80. Thomas D. Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 18 (Dec. 1997), at http://www.fbi.gov/publicationsleb/1997/Aeb97.htm.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also M. Annette Lanning, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky
Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773 (1995) (describing how FLIR
systems operate).
83. See Matthew L. Zabel, A High-Tech Assault on the "Castle": Warrantless Thermal
Surveillance of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 267, 280 n.100
(1995) (stating that thermal imaging devices detect only heat emissions).
84. Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This Technological
Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amendment Protections Against
Unreasonable Searches?, 83 Ky. L.J. 891, 897 (1995).
85. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1518-19 (W.D. Wis. 1994); United States v.
Penney-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991).
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growing of marijuana requires high intensity growth lamps for optimum
yields.86 These lamps produce hot exhaust gases that must be vented in
order to maintain an optimum growing temperature of 68 to 72 degrees
Fahrenheit.87 Thermal imaging devices allow law enforcement personnel
to detect hot exhaust gases emanating from structures by comparing the
relative heat passively radiated from different environments.88 An agent
is able to tell the relative heat signature of an object by simply directing a
thermal imaging device at it; no probes or sampling devices need to be
attached to the target structure.89 A thermal imaging device requires no
special modification to be employed in this drug detection role; no
transmission of penetrating rays or pulses is necessary to see the exhaust
gases. 90
B. Pre-Kyllo Decisions Dealing with the Use of Thermal Imaging De-
vices
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was the
first court in the federal system to rule on the pre-warrant use of thermal
imaging devices. In the case of Pinson v. United States,9' the court con-
cluded that the use of these devices did not constitute a search because
they failed the second prong of the Katz test.92 The court decided that
even if a defendant could show an expectation of privacy, that expecta-
tion would not be one that society would accept as reasonable for two
reasons. 93 First, the court concluded that thermal imaging devices merely
detected waste heat, and by analogy, this was similar to the waste left at a
curb. 94 The significance of this reasoning was that the Supreme Court
had concluded, in the case of California v. Greenwood,95 that the police
could search waste left at a curb because the individual had demonstrated
86. Wilson, supra note 84, at 893.
87. Lynne M. Pochurek, From the Battlefield to the Homefront: Infrared Surveillance and the
War on Drugs Place Privacy Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137, 150 n.99 (1994).
88. Tracy M. White, The Heat is On: The Warrantless Use of Infrared Surveillance to Detect
Indoor Marijuana Cultivation, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295, 295 (1995).
89. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding the use of a
thermal imaging device to be passive and non-intrusive); Wilson, supra note 84, at 896-97.
90. Wilson, supra note 84, at 896 n.54.
91. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. See Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment Search-Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New
"Bright Line" Rule in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 Wyo. L.
REV. 169, 183-84 (2002).
93. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
94. Id.
95. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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that he no longer maintained an expectation of privacy in the contents of
that waste.96
The second reason the court concluded that there was no search was
that the use of infrared sampling devices was similar to a search by a
canine unit. As the court noted, "Just as odor escapes a compartment or
building and is detected by the sense-enhancing instrument of a canine
sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is detected by the sense-
enhancing [thermal imager]. '97 Again, the significance of this compari-
son is that in the case of United States v. Place,98 the Supreme Court had
concluded that a canine search by a narcotics detection dog was clearly
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 99
Concerns about the application of this rationale to thermal imaging
devices can be found from a closer scrutiny of a typical "canine-sniff'
decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the case of
United States v. Solis0 ° is illustrative of this line of thinking. The court
concluded that a canine sniff did not constitute a search because "[n]o
sophisticated mechanical or electronic devices were used [and the] ...
investigation was not indiscriminate, but solely directed to the particular
contraband."' 1 This stands in obvious contrast to passive heat detection
where sophisticated mechanical devices are used. However, the majority
of pre-Kyllo courts that considered the constitutional implications of
thermal imaging devices agreed with the Eighth Circuit, concluding that
their use did not constitute a search.
10 2
In addition to the "waste heat" and "canine enhancement" doctrines,
courts have also relied upon the "plain view" doctrine to conclude that
use of these devices is not a search. 0 3 The "plain view" doctrine simply
states that officers are not required to obtain a warrant prior to observing
details that would be readily observable by any member of the public' °4
This is an extension of the "open fields" doctrine discussed above. Al-
though applying "plain view" to seeing through walls appears somewhat
96. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35 ("It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left along
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of
the public.").
97. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058.
98. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
99. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (Defendant's conviction was eventually overturned because the
officers had detained the defendant's luggage for an unreasonable period of time and because the
officers failed to communicate to the defendant where they were taking his luggage.).
100. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 at 882.
102. E.g., Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850; United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056; United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (1 1th Cir. 1994); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
103. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 853.
104. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1986).
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attenuated based on common English definitions, when the subject mat-
ter is an object's invisible heat signature, at least one court has indicated
that if used from a position where any member of the public could law-
fully be located, an agent has not performed a search.10 5 Support for this
approach was also drawn from the Court's decisions in Florida v. Ri-
ley' °6 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,107 cases involving the first
applications of technology generally available to the public as a means to
restrict the sphere of privacy rights. 108
The pre-Kyllo minority viewpoint that determined that use of a
thermal imaging device did constitute a search relied upon different ra-
tionales to reach this conclusion. Some courts expressed a concern about
revealing the "intimate details regarding activities occurring within the
sanctity of the home,"' 1 9 while others focused on the "indiscriminate"
nature of the device." 10 The first court to conclude that use of a thermal
imaging device did constitute a search, found that such searches were "at
least as intrusive" as the electronic beeper that was the subject of the
Supreme Court's holding in the Karo case."'
Other courts have rejected the claim that the passive nature of these
devices precludes them from intruding upon the sanctity of the home,
concluding instead that the principle reason for use of this technology is
to enable an agent to view intimate details of the home."12 The case of
State v. Young," 3 decided by the Washington Supreme Court, is illustra-
tive of minority viewpoints on waste and canine sniff analogies. In
Young, the court decided that the emission of waste heat was not similar
to the garbage at issue in the Greenwood case because unlike the disposal
of garbage, a person does not foresee the use of sophisticated instruments
to detect waste heat emissions. 14 In a foreshadowing of the rationale
used in the Kyllo case, the court noted that thermal imaging "produces an
image of the interior of the home . . . [and allows] the government to
intrude into the defendant's home and gather information about what
occurs there."' ' 5 The court also rejected the canine sniff analogy by es-
105. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854.
106. 448 U.S. 445 (1989).
107. 476 U.S. 227.
108. See Riley, 448 U.S. at 446; Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238-39 (stating the conclusion
that the plant area at issue fell somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage for privacy interest
purposes, and that surveillance of these areas with highly sophisticated devices might be
constitutionally prohibited, but the mapmaking camera at issue in the case would not reveal enough
intimate details to violate the Fourth Amendment).
109. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. 1999).
110. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996).
111. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602 (Wash. 1994).
112. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
113. 867 P.2d 593.




tablishing that canine sniffs are unique because they detect the existence
or non-existence of illegal drugs. 116
These polar opposite outcomes, based upon essentially similar tests,
illustrate that the Katz framework was ill-equipped to provide judicial
consensus about the nature of an individual's right to privacy in light of
technological advances. Courts diverged on both prongs of the Katz test,
namely on what society considered reasonable and whether society was
prepared to recognize that heat loss observation should be constitution-
ally protected.' 17 Kyllo provided the Court with an opportunity to address
these differing positions.
Ill. KYLLO V. UNITED STATES
118
A. The Facts of Kyllo
In 1991, Special Agent William Elliot of the Department of the Inte-
rior, Bureau of Land Management, came to suspect Danny Kyllo was
growing marijuana in his home. 19 Agent Elliot first attempted to confirm
his suspicions by subpoenaing and then examining utility records to
compare average electricity use against dwellings of similar size.'
20
Based in part upon the confirmed higher electricity demand, Agent Elliot
requested Staff Sergeant Daniel Haas of the Oregon National Guard to
examine the triplex where Mr. Kyllo lived with a thermal imaging de-
vice.' 21 In the early morning hours of January 16, 1992, a thermal scan
was conducted from the passenger seat of Agent Elliot's vehicle, which
was parked across the street from Mr. Kyllo's residence.' 22 The scan took
only a few moments and showed that the roof over the garage and a side
wall of the petitioner's house were relatively hot compared to the rest of
the home and to other homes in the triplex area. 123 Agent Elliot used this
information, the higher electricity usage, and tips from informants to
convince a federal Magistrate to issue a search warrant for Mr. Kyllo's
116. Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S.at 707).
117. See Gindlesperger, 753 A.2d at 903 (holding "that the proper focus of our inquiry should
be on whether Appellee was able to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the heat-
generating activities occurring within his home").
118. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
119. Kyllo, 533U.S. at29.
120. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Or. 1992), aff d in part, United States v.
Kyllo, 26 F.3d 134 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir.
1994), rev'd, United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), opinion withdrawn, United
States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion superseded, United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d
1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (Agent Elliot examined the utility records because
higher power usage is consistent with the need to run high power growth lamps used to stimulate
marijuana plant growth.). But see Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 (stating that utility records may reveal
high power usage, but do not by themselves disclose the purposes behind the higher consumption).
121. Kyllo, 140F.3dat1251.
122. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
123. Id.
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home.124 When the search was conducted, agents discovered "an indoor
growing operation involving more than 100 plants," ultimately leading
Mr. Kyllo to conditionally plead guilty to one count of manufacturing
marijuana.
125
The procedural history of the case is confusing, starting with the de-
cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to re-
mand the case to the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon for an evidentiary hearing to determine the constitutional implica-
tions of thermal imaging.126 The district court subsequently concluded
that given its non-intrusive nature, use of the thermal imager did not con-
stitute a search, a conclusion with which a three judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit disagreed. 127 The government then moved for rehearing, and the
Ninth Circuit eventually affirmed the decision of the district court, hold-
ing that use of the thermal imaging device did not constitute a search.
128
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in the winter of 2000.129
B. The Kyllo Ratio Decidendi
The first interesting point to note about the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Kyllo is that Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the court,
joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer. 3 ° This is
noteworthy because of Justice Scalia' s nearly universal application of the
principle of strict interpretation of the Constitution in assessing the im-
plications of judicial decision-making.131
The Court introduces its analysis with a passage establishing the
constitutional primacy of the home as being "at the very core of the
Fourth Amendment."'' 32 The Court then cites precedent for the principle
that "with few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."
133
However, the Court then notes that decisions have "decoupled violation
of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from a trespassory violation of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kyllo, 37 F.3d at 531.
127. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255.
128. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1041.
129. Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
130. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
131. See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation:
Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (2001); Daniel Farber, The
Scholarly Attorney as Lawyerly Judge: Stevens on Statutes, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxxv,
xxxvii; Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (commenting on the standards of constitutional
interpretation).
132. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).




his property,"' 134 citing the Katz decision for the familiar principle that "a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."'
' 35
The Court acknowledges that this principle has included the constitu-
tional recognition of the legitimacy of home surveillance by authorities
under certain circumstances.'
36
The majority then wastes no time in attacking this standard, citing,
among other supporting documents, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Minnesota v. Carter,'37 for the proposition that the privacy-expectation
doctrine is circular in nature. 38 Having thus concluded that the corner-
stone test of Fourth Amendment application is flawed, the Court con-
cedes that "it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas
such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even ... uncovered portions of
residences are at issue."' 39 The majority then proceeds to draw the line at
what they consider to be the "prototypical . . . area of protected pri-
vacy," 140 the interior of homes. In rejecting the government's contention
that pre-warrant use of a thermal imaging device is constitutional be-
cause it does not "detect private activities occurring in private areas,"141
the Court notes that "any physical invasion of the structure of the home
'by even a fraction of an inch' [is] too much."'' 42 The Court then con-
cludes by establishing a "firm line at the entrance to the house,"'43 ruling
that "where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general pub-
lic use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and
is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."'
44
C. The Dissent
Justice Stevens authored the dissent, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Conner, and Justice Kennedy joined.145 Ironically,
the dissent invokes the principle of strict constitutional interpretation, a
Scalia refrain notably missing from the majority opinion, citing the
Fourth Amendment for the principle of protecting the right of the people
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
136. Id. (citing Florida v. Riley, 458 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
137. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
138. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
143. Id. at 40.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"to be secure in their houses,"'146 and not to extend that privacy to "heat
emanating from a building." 1
47
The dissent attacks the majority opinion on two grounds. First, Jus-
tice Stevens invokes shades of the plain view doctrine by comparing the
surveillance conducted in the instant case to the ability of officers "to
gather information exposed to the general public."'' 48 The dissent accuses
the majority of deciding the case based upon "the potential of yet-to-be-
developed technology," raising the specter of the Court issuing an advi-
sory opinion based on facts not yet before them.' 49 The dissent further
elucidates this critique of over-inclusiveness by noting that this new pro-
tection blocks inferences about the interior of the home drawn from ob-
servation with sense-enhancing equipment. 1 50 Justice Stevens provides an
example, noting that "under that expansive view... an officer using an
infrared camera to observe a man . . . entering the side door of a house
... carrying a pizza might conclude that its interior is now occupied by
someone who likes pizza,"' 51 an observation that would amount to an
unconstitutional search under the majority's new test. 152
The second critique by the dissent is that the term "in general public
use" fails at its stated goal of drawing a line "not only firm but also
bright."' 53 The dissent notes "how much public use is general public use
is not even hinted at by the Court's opinion,"'' 54 precluding establishment
of a clear standard. 55 Interestingly, the central concern associated with
this new standard is that there is no set or quantative standard for future
judicial application, a critique applicable just as easily to the Katz test.1
56
Therefore, courts are in no better position than they were before, left with
a test without precedent and no workable definition or standard of "gen-
eral public use."
As the use of technology like this becomes more common, "the
threat to privacy will grow," and the vital protections of the Fourth
Amendment will fail at precisely the time the general public has the
146. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see North Carolina v. Rice, 92 S. Ct. 402, 404 (1971) ("To be
cognizeable in federal court, a suit must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief ... as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be based upon a
hypothetical state of facts.").
150. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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greatest need of them. 5 7 This author's position is that, because of this
failure, the Supreme Court should reject the new Kyllo test, and return to
an insistence upon the fundamental value underlying the Fourth
Amendment, the need for protection against unreasonable searches of not
just a person's home, but also her "person, . . . papers, and effects."'
' 58
IV. THE KYLLO CONNUNDRUM: THE COURT FAILS TO ADVANCE A
STANDARD THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE FLEXIBLE NATURE OF PRIVACY
RIGHTS
The majority in Kyllo acknowledges that the Katz decision marked a
transition from a purely property-based approach to Fourth Amendment
analysis, to a flexible protection tied to an individual's privacy inter-
ests. 159 In its critique of this judicial reasoning, the Court points out that
because what is objectively reasonable varies with development of more
invasive technology, a Katz-based analysis ultimately leads to "subjec-
tive and unpredictable" decisions. 60 However, the new test developed by
the Court falls victim to this same critique in two critical areas. First, the
Kyllo test fails in its adoption of the "device not in general use" standard.
Second, the Court reverts back to a property-based analysis of Fourth
Amendment rights, one ill-equipped to handle the challenges of an in-
creasingly mobile and transitory society.
A. What is General Public Use?
To begin with, numerous commentators have criticized the Kyllo
decision for its failure to articulate guidelines for what is meant by the
term "device not in general public use."' 6' As the dissent even notes, the
majority's criteria suffers from the same defect as its intellectual prede-
cessor in Katz, as the protections inherent in this test will fail as more
intrusive equipment becomes increasingly available. 62 For example,
hunters and other outdoorsmen 163 currently employ thermal imaging de-
vices for private use, and consumers may soon see them installed on new
vehicles.' 64 Fire departments 165 and border patrols' 66 are also pushing the
157. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
160. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
161. See Sarilyn E. Hardee, Why the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United
States is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMBELL L. REV. 53,
69 (2001); Thueson, supra note 90, at 192-95.
162. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Steven, J., dissenting).
163. See Accurate Locations, Target Location Viewer: Thermal Imaging Detector, at
http:www.accuratelocators.comitargetinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
164. See Raytheon, Transportation: See Better, Decide Faster, Drive Safer, at http:www.ray-
theoninfrared.com/transportation/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003); United States v. Cusumano,
67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing application of thermal imaging technology).
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use of this technology into new and unexpected areas. However, the dis-
sent and other commentators have not reflected on the implications this
standard has for the broad spectrum of Fourth Amendment protections,
especially in light of the cumulative effects of the inevitable cross-
application between residential and general uses of new technology.
Although the Kyllo ruling was limited to the context of investigation
of the interior of a house, the majority opinion does espouse as one of its
principal objectives the need to "account for more sophisticated systems
that are already in use or development."' 16 One very apparent critique of
this line of thinking is that it violates the Court's long established prohi-
bition against deciding issues that are not yet properly before the
Court. 168 Another, more subtle, critique of this reasoning addresses its
obvious implications for other aspects of Fourth Amendment protections.
Although James Tomkovicz, the lawyer for Mr. Kyllo, believes that "it's
hard to know what they'll do with equivalent technology outside the
home," it's easy to see how application of this rule to other areas of
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law could occur. 169 The perva-
siveness of jurisprudential references to the Greenwood case (involving
domicile-based activity) in non-residential applications demonstrates the
ease with which home-oriented tests translate into other areas of search-
and-seizure law. 170
If the "general public use" test sufficiently provides protection for
the residential "core of the Fourth Amendment,"1 71 then courts will more
likely allow use of invasive technology in areas less tied to the traditional
Fourth Amendment centers of personal privacy: "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects."1 72 Imagine a world where the commercial use of Inter-
net "cookies" ultimately served to justify random scans of all e-mail, or
government tracking of a citizen's Web use. Certainly, this would seem
to be inside the spectrum of protection envisioned in the "papers ... and
165. Firefighters Test New Thermal Imaging Devices During 3 Fires, at http:www.nassaufire-
rescue.com/thermal.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
166. FLIR Systems, Border Patrol, at http:www.flir.com/ground/application.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2003).
167. Id. at 36.
168. See, e.g., Thueson, supra note 92, at 201.
169. Jeffrey Benner, Kyllo: Taking the 5th on the 4th (July 3, 2001), at http://www.wired.com-
Inewslprivacyl0,1848,44785,00.html.
170. See Wabuni-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that use of an F-stop
for exposing photographs sufficiently defeats a claim of Fourth Amendment protection, just as the
trash in Greenwood displayed a similar lack of subjective expectation of privacy); United States v.
Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11 th Cir. 1995) (discussing the portability of the Greenwood test to commercial
property); Powell v. State, 776 A.2d 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (citing the Greenwood test in
deriving its holding that leaving a paper bag full of drugs in a gutter amounts to a loss of a subjective
expectation of privacy).
171. Kyllo,533U.S.at3l.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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effects" term in the Fourth Amendment. 173 However, the Supreme
Court's new standard would establish that general use of this technology
would preclude any constitutionally protected privacy right. As these
examples demonstrate, the cumulative effect of the introduction of home
and personal effects-based applications of technology would produce a
spiral of ever increasing general use. This, in turn, would produce an
ever-shrinking zone of personal privacy protection, a situation that the
majority could hardly have intended. This shrinking zone of privacy is
also reflected in the next major shortcoming of the Supreme Court's test,
the reversion of privacy protection to a property-based rationale.
B. Reversion to Property-Based Standards
In Kyllo, the majority refused to apply the traditional Katz test, in-
stead resurrecting old Constitutional theories under a new name. The
Kyllo test refocuses the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the
common law protections of the "prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated are of protected privacy," 174 the interior of the home. This crite-
ria ensures "preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted," 175 a not-so-
subtle nod to the jurisprudential bias of Justice Scalia. However, the Su-
preme Court's new test leaves unanswered the question of how cases like
Olmstead and Katz would be decided under this "details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion"
standard. 176 Although Justice Scalia's critique of the Katz-standard as
being circular in nature was on target, these early decisions at least made
reference to a zone of privacy that extended beyond a person's property.
The language of physical intrusion suggests that trespassory concepts are
again the critical underpinning of Fourth Amendment protection. These
concepts seem least equipped to handle potential controversies of inves-
tigatory action in areas where the highest technology thresholds exist.
For example, the Supreme Court's new test provides no viable stan-
dard for evaluating technology like the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Carnivore program. 177 Carnivore is designed to sweep through a large
volume of e-mail without being detected, looking for key words and
phrases that match a profile.1 78 Since it performs this sweep by merely
intercepting transmitted message data, it falls short of the "physical in-
trusion" of personal property. In addition, most, if not all, of the intrinsic
173. Id.
174. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 40.
177. See Eichenlaub, supra note 27 (discussing the Carnivore program).
178. See Jerry Seper, FBI Follies Continue, WASH. TIMES, June 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL
2912066; Catherine M. Barrett, FBI Internet Surveillance: The Need for a Natural Rights
Application of the Fourth Amendment to Insure Internet Privacy, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16 (2002).
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information in this electronic message traffic reveals information not
about the intimate details of a person's home, but information personal
and particular to an individual. This is exactly the same information re-
jected as a basis for specific constitutional protection by Justice Scalia,
179
and, as a result, the individual can expect no protection from any Carni-
vore-derived technology due to the ruling in Kyllo.
C. The Precision Offered to Police
One other substantial concern can be identified from the new
"bright-line" standard offered by the majority in the Kyllo decision. As
one of its critical goals, the majority seeks to develop a standard that will
provide clear guidance to law enforcement personnel. 180 The dissent
notes a shortcoming of this standard in its failure to account for new
technologies clearly outside the "general public use" standard but still
oriented toward receiving or analyzing details in which the subject is
clearly no longer manifesting any expectation of privacy. 18' The exten-
sion of this analysis includes criticism of the "details of the home" stan-
dard as being overbroad in its restraint of the powers of law enforcement
investigation, which the dissent notes in its pizza delivery example.1
82
While the dissent does point out some interesting potential applica-
tions that clearly appear jeopardized by the decision in Kyllo, the greatest
impact missed by even the dissent is on already existing law enforcement
technology successfully employed in numerous previous investigations.
For example, the Court notes that in Smith v. Maryland,183 application of
the Katz test led the Court to conclude that use of a pen register by police
at the phone company to determine numbers dialed from a private home
was not a search. 184 Under the new Kyllo rationale, however, the pen
register would most likely be found to be 1) "a device that is not in gen-
eral public use" and 2) a device that would reveal "details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without a physical intru-
sion" (arguably, the phone numbers a person dials fall into this area). 85
As the majority opinion acknowledges, the difficulty lies in provid-
ing a standard that enables an officer to know before the surveillance
begins whether she is encroaching on personal privacy to an extent pro-
179. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
180. Id. at 39 ("The people in their houses, as well as the police, deserve more precision.").
181. Id. at 47-48 (decrying the inability to account for mechanical substitutes for dogs, or more
pragmatically, devices that could detect deadly bacteria or chemicals).
182. Id. at 48 ("Under that expansive view, .... an officer using an infrared camera to observe a
man silently entering the side door of a house at night carrying a pizza . . . would be guilty of
conducting an unconstitutional 'search' of the home.").
183. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).




tected by the Fourth Amendment.186 However, by completely eliminating
any reference to objective expectations of privacy and replacing them
with the "details of the home" standard, the Court actually invites a re-
gressive view of surveillance into its jurisprudence. What was a simpler
analysis for law enforcement personnel to conduct (the degree to which
the person is demonstrating an expectation of privacy distinct from pub-
lic access) is now much more problematic for the officer (what details,
no matter how accessible to the general public, are within the "details of
the home?"). Instead of allowing an officer to use her experience and
common sense in assessing what a reasonable person would consider a
private area, the Court now asks that officer to decide what a court would
consider "details of the home," a subject as yet undefined in any juris-
prudence.187 By failing to define these essential terms of the Kyllo test,
the Court leaves both law enforcement officers and the courts without
guidance as to how to evaluate the subjective determinations of officers
on the street, a situation that will inevitably result in extensive Constitu-
tional appeals.
CONCLUSION
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court clearly articulated
some of the faults of the existing legal standards for assessing an indi-
vidual's right to privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment. How-
ever, despite the meritorious attempt to define a bright line standard that
would address the application of new investigatory technology, the ra-
tionale expressed in Kyllo actually represents a step back for privacy
protection. By failing to provide an objective standard-such as society's
willingness to accept a manifestation of privacy as reasonable-Kyllo
fails to provide a static target for dispassionate judicial review of law
enforcement activities. In addition, the re-introduction of trespassory
concepts as the basis for privacy rights represents a severe limitation on
the application of Kyllo to preemptively address new law enforcement
technology.
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186. Id. at 39 (discussing why the Court could not establish a standard based upon the principle
of "intimate details").
187. See Thueson, supra note 92, at 197.
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